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CIVIL PROCEDURE
LISA M. BURKE* and JOANN KELEHER**

I. INTRODUCTION

The New Mexico appellate courts decided approximately eighty cases
involving questions of civil procedure law during the survey year. Not
all of the cases are considered in this Article. Discussion of cases reaf2
firming the standard for directed verdicts' and summary judgments has
been omitted, as has discussion of cases interpreting statutes of limitation
because several of these cases are currently pending in the New Mexico
Supreme Court.3 The cases that are discussed are organized in this Article
according to the sequence in which they are presented in a lawsuit.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Questions concerning the scope of the jurisdiction of New Mexico state
courts continue to arise. If a court does not have jurisdiction, the judge
cannot act in any matter that might require him to use his discretion. In
Pueblo of Laguna v. Cillessen & Son, Inc.,' for example, the supreme
court held that once a proper affidavit of disqualification of a judge has
*Member, Class of 1985, University of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
**Member, Class of 1985, University of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
1. Toppino v. Herhahn, 100 N.M. 564, 673 P.2d 1297 (1983); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Price, 101 N.M. 438, 684 P.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1984).
2. Young v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 101 N.M. 545, 685 P.2d 953 (1984); Sema v. Roche
Laboratories, 101 N.M. 522, 684 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1984); New Mexico Tire & Battery Co. v.
Ole Tires, 101 N.M. 357, 683 P.2d 39 (1984); Tabet v. Campbell, 101 N.M. 334, 681 P.2d Il
(1984); Sprague v. City of Las Vegas, 101 N.M. 185, 679 P.2d 1283 (1984); Wine v. Neal, 100
N.M. 431, 671 P.2d 1142 (1983); Walker v. Key, 101 N.M. 631, 686 P.2d 973 (Ct. App.), cert.
quashed, 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 963 (1984); Penny v. Sherman, 101 N.M. 517, 684 P.2d 1182
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 963 (1984); Kerman v. Swafford, 101 N.M. 241,
680 P.2d 622 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 189, 679 P.2d 1287 (1984); Gantt v. L & G Air
Conditioning, 101 N.M. 208, 680 P.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed, 101 N.M. 189, 679
P.2d 1287 (1984); Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin., 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 (Ct.
App. 1984); Hendren v. Allstate Ins. Co., 100 N.M. 506, 672 P.2d 1137 (Ct. App. 1983); Parrish
v. McDaniel, 101 N.M. 257, 680 P.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1984); Armijo v. Albuquerque Anesthesia
Servs., 101 N.M. 129, 679 P.2d 271 (Ct. App. 1984); LeBlanc v. Northern Colfax County Hosp.,
100 N.M. 494, 672 P.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1983).
3. Kern v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc., 24 N.M. Bar Bull. 10 (Ct. App. Jan. 10, 1985), cert. granted,
24 N.M. Bar Bull. 17 (Jan. 17, 1985); Irvine v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc., 23 N.M. Bar Bull. 1257
(Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1984), cert. granted, 23 N.M. Bar Bull. 1241 (Dec. 6, 1984); Keithley v. St.
Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 23 N.M. Bar Bull. 1220 (Ct. App. Nov. 29, 1984), cert. granted, 23 N.M.
Bar Bull. 1297 (Dec. 20, 1984).
4. 101 N.M. 341, 682 P.2d 197 (1984).
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been filed, that judge has no jurisdiction to exercise his discretion in any
matter.5
In Martinez v. Martinez,6 the court of appeals reminded attorneys that
once an appeal from an order of the district court is filed, the district
court loses jurisdiction. The appellant filed his notice of appeal before
filing his requested findings of fact. The filing of the notice of appeal
divested the district court of its jurisdiction. 7
The supreme court clarified the scope of district court jurisdiction on
remand in Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Thevenet.8 The court reiterated its holding in Vinton Eppsco, Inc. v. Showe Homes, Inc.,9 stating
that a district court has jurisdiction only to comply with the mandate of
the appellate court on remand.'o Even if the district court is certain that
the opinion of the appellate court is incorrect, the district court lacks
jurisdiction to exceed the bounds of that opinion. " An award of attorneys'
fees, without an express order of the court, was therefore outside the
bounds of the trial court's jurisdiction on remand. 2
In Kutz v. IndependentPublishingCo., 3 the court held that a trial court
has authority not only to order a default judgment as a sanction for failure
to comply with court instructions, but if the default judgment is set aside
on certain conditions, the failure to comply with those conditions will
result in reinstatement of the default judgment. 4 The defendants argued
that the court had no power to enter the default judgment merely because
they had missed a deadline, but that argument failed. 5 Once the original
default judgment had been entered based on a failure to "otherwise defend" under Rule 55(a),' 6 the court had jurisdiction to impose conditions
to set aside that judgment. 7 The court, therefore, had jurisdiction to re5. Id. at 343, 682 P.2d at 199.
6. 101 N.M. 493, 684 P.2d 1158 (Ct. App. 1984).
7. Id. at 495, 684 P.2d at 1160. Furthermore, because the appellant had failed to file his requested
findings of fact before filing his notice of appeal, he had waived his right to object to the sufficiency
of the evidence. Id. at 496, 684 P.2d at 1161.
8. 101 N.M. 612, 686 P.2d 954 (1984).
9. 97 N.M. 225, 638 P.2d 1070 (1981).
10. 101 N.M. at 614, 686 P.2d at 956.
11. Id.
12. Id. The supreme court, however, did award attorneys' fees, stating that it had neglected to
do so through an oversight. While the district court had no jurisdiction to award the fees, the supreme
court was able to do so to correct the matter. The supreme court relied on Southwestern Inv. Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 623, 241 P.2d 985 (1952), to correct "a matter inadvertently
overlooked" on its own motion. 101 N.M. at 614, 686 P.2d at 956.
13. 101 N.M. 587, 686 P.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1984).
14. Id. at 589-90, 686 P.2d at 279-80. The breach of the conditions imposed need not have
anything to do with the original default judgment.
15. The defendants missed a pretrial conference, failed to obtain counsel after being instructed
to do so by the court, and generally obstructed the progress of the action. Id. at 590-91, 686 P.2d
at 280-81.
16. N.M. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
17. N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The court can set aside a final judgment upon "such terms as are
just."
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impose the judgment when the defendants failed to comply with those
conditions.
In a worker's compensation case, the court of appeals ruled that the
trial court had jurisdiction to hear an employer's petition to reduce or to
terminate the compensation paid to an employee when the employee
refused to submit to medical treatment.' 8 It was not necessary that the
9
court award the compensation in order to hear the petition.' In Brooks
v. Hobbs Municipal School, the court of appeals held that N.M. Stat.
Ann. section 52-1-51 (1978) implicitly gave the court jurisdiction to hear
such a petition even when the employer was paying benefits voluntarily,
rather than as a result of adjudication.2" The court compared section 521-51 to section 52-1-56(A), which allows a court to change the amount
of compensation if there is a change in the worker's condition; it noted
that the district court's jurisdiction under the latter section was limited
2
to courts "in which any workman has been awarded compensation." '
Because there is no such limit on the jurisdiction of a court if the claimant
refuses to undergo medical treatment and the court had jurisdiction to
order a decrease in benefits under section 52-1-51, the court of appeals
decided that the district court had jurisdiction to consider a petition to
decrease benefits.22
The district court also had jurisdiction to reinstate a complaint that had
been twice dismissed sua sponte for failure to prosecute, according to
the court in Mora v. Hunick.23 The court of appeals ruled that the trial
court had jurisdiction to reinstate the complaint even though the statute
of limitation had run when the complaint was reinstated for the second
time.24 The record did not reflect the authority under which the trial court
acted in dismissing the case, but the court of appeals assumed that the
court's action was predicated upon its inherent authority. The case was
then over unless the trial court chose to reinstate it properly.25 The court
chose to do so; because the time between the second dismissal and the
reinstatement was only seven weeks and a motion to reopen a final judgment could be made under N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) within one year, the
reinstatement was proper and the court had jurisdiction.2 6
Two recent cases have broadly interpreted the scope of the jurisdiction
of the New Mexico courts when an action is brought pursuant to the
688 P.2d 25 (Ct. App. 1984).
N.M. -,
18. Brooks v. Hobbs Mun. School, 19. Id. at -. , 688 P.2d at 28.
20. Id. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-51 (1978) gives a court discretion to reduce or terminate an award
of benefits if an employee refuses to undergo medical treatment.
, 688 P.2d at 28 (emphasis added).
N.M. at
21. 22. Id.
23. 100 N.M. 466, 672 P.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1983).
24. Id. at 469, 672 P.2d at 298.
25. Id. at 468, 672 P.2d at 297.
26. Id. at 468, 469, 672 P.2d at 297, 298.
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Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA). 27
In Altman v. Altman,2" the court of appeals determined that New Mexico
courts had jurisdiction to modify a Florida divorce decree. The Altmans
were divorced in Florida in 1980. Mr. Altman later moved to New Mexico.
After Mr. Altman fell behind in his alimony and child support payments,
Mrs. Altman initiated an action under RURESA to enforce the payments.
Mr. Altman argued that the district court should modify the decree because
of changed circumstances.29 Following a hearing to contest the enforcement of the obligations, the trial court lowered the amount of alimony
and increased the amount of child support due the wife. Mrs. Altman
appealed, claiming that the district court had no jurisdiction to consider
the husband's allegations of changed circumstances or to modify the
decree based upon those changed circumstances. She argued that section
40-6-39(c) did not allow the court to hear any defense but those permitted
in actions to enforce foreign money judgments."
The court considered the jurisdiction of the trial court over the questions
of alimony and child support separately. Noting that it was not clear that
RURESA applied to alimony, the court analyzed the question of jurisdiction, first assuming that RURESA applied, and then assuming that it
did not.3 The court found that the district court had jurisdiction to modify
the decree under both Florida and New Mexico law; the court, therefore,
was not forced to decide whether RURESA applied to the enforcement
of alimony payments.32
Under RURESA, New Mexico law clearly is applicable to modifications of child support.33 Because New Mexico law allows modification
of child support decrees upon a showing of changed circumstances, the
district court had jurisdiction to increase the amount of child support due,
even though it was the court's unilateral decision to do so. 34
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§40-6-1 to -41 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
28. 101 N.M. 380, 683 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1984).
29. Mr. Altman's gross income was $225,000 per year at the time of the divorce. His annual
income at the time of the hearings in the RURESA action was $61,000. Id. at 382, 683 P.2d at 64.
30. Id. at 383, 683 P.2d at 65.
31. Id. at 383-84, 683 P.2d at 65-66. If RURESA applied to alimony, New Mexico law would
be applicable, and the court would be empowered to hear the defaulting obligor's motion to modify
the support order. The court analyzed N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-6-39 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) and noted
that, while §40-6-39(A) provided that foreign support orders were to be treated as New Mexico
support orders, §40-6-39(C) restricted the defenses the obligor might use at the hearing. The court
stated that §40-6-39(B) resolved the conflict between the two sections by granting the obligor 20
days to petition the court for relief. Once relief was requested, the court had the power to modify
the decree. Florida law provided that support decrees could be modified, so the court had authority
to modify the decree prospectively under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) if RURESA
did not apply.
32. 101 N.M. at 384-85, 683 P.2d at 66-67.
33. Id. at 385, 683 P.2d at 67. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-6-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
34. 101 N.M. at 385-86, 683 P.2d at 67-68. Neither party had requested an increase in child
support payments, but when the trial court decreased the amount of alimony to be paid, it increased
the amount to be paid in child support. The court pointed out that under the property settlement,
child support was to increase when the alimony payments ended. id.
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In the second case analyzing the jurisdiction of New Mexico courts
under RURESA, the court of appeals found that the trial court had jurisdiction to order the obligor to pay child support, although the decree
state's court would have lacked such jurisdiction. In State ex rel. Alleman
v. Shoats,35 a mother attempted to force a father to pay child support
under a Missouri divorce decree. The father, while conceding his duty
to support his children, attacked the New Mexico court's jurisdiction to
order child support under a RURESA action. He argued that no court
had jurisdiction under RURESA to order support because the Missouri
court which had presided over the divorce did not have personal jurisdiction over him. Furthermore, the New Mexico district court had found
that the Missouri court lacked jurisdiction to order him to pay child
support; it, therefore, refused to give full faith and credit to the Missouri
decree. 36
The court of appeals rejected the father's argument, holding that the
district court had jurisdiction to order support and was not limited to
enforcing the decree state's order.37 Relying on Natewa v. Natewa,38 the
court noted that jurisdiction is proper when an obligor in New Mexico
owes support to someone in another state and has a duty of support under
the laws of New Mexico.39 In fact, the court has jurisdiction to order
support even when the question of support has not been previously determined.'
New Mexico courts have jurisdiction to change the custodial parent,
but have discretion to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction. In Hester v.
Hester,4 the court held that while the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction under the Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (CCJA)42 to transfer
custody to the father, it did not abuse its discretion by refusing to assert
jurisdiction.43 The father and mother had obtained their divorce in Santa
Fe District Court. The mother then moved to Colorado, taking their child
with her. Three months later, when the child was visiting the father in
New Mexico, the father petitioned for a change of custody in the same
court which had awarded custody to the mother in the final divorce decree.
The trial court held that New Mexico was not a convenient forum, finding
that asserting jurisdiction would encourage custody litigation and prevent
that litigation in the state in which the child presently lived. 44 Since the
35. 101 N.M. 512, 684 P.2d 1177 (Ct. App. 1984).
36. Id.at 515, 684 P.2d at 1180.
37. Id.at 516, 684 P.2d at 1181.
38. 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691 (1972).
39. 101 N.M. at 516, 684 P.2d at 1181.
40. Id.
41. 100 N.M. 773, 676 P.2d 1338 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 11,677 P.2d 624 (1984).
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-10-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
43. 100 N.M. at 775, 676 P.2d at 1340.
44. Id.at 777, 676 P.2d at 1342. The trial court relied on guidelines embodied in N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§40-10-2(C), (D) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
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CCJA was enacted to prevent such occurrences, the court declined to
exercise its jurisdiction.
The court of appeals found that the trial court's findings were supported
by substantial evidence.4 5 The court noted that application of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens is within the discretion of the trial court, and
while the evidence was close, the appellate court would not weigh it as
long as the trial court had not abused its discretion.'
In Los Alamos County v. Beery,47 the supreme court addressed the
appellate jurisdiction of the district court. The district court had ordered
a remand five months after it dismissed an appeal from a magistrate court
as moot. The pro se defendant argued that the court had no jurisdiction
to order the remand because the dismissal was an adjudication on the
merits. The supreme court noted that a district court's order of dismissal
of an appeal from a magistrate court in effect affirmed the magistrate
48
court judgment and, therefore, was not an adjudication on the merits.
Ordering a remand returned jurisdiction to the magistrate court, so the
judgment could be enforced. The court characterized the remand as "housekeeping. "49
The court of appeals distinguished the jurisdictional requirements for
an appeal de novo to the district court from the procedural requirements
50
in Sleeper v. Ensenada Land & Water Association. The case involved
an appeal from a decision on water rights by the State Engineer. While
the notice of appeal had to be filed within thirty days of the receipt of
the decision, and a copy of that notice had to be served upon the parties
within thirty days of the filing of the notice of appeal, the failure to file
proof of service within thirty days of serving the opposing party would
5
not defeat the jurisdiction of the district court. ' The court reasoned that
filing proof of service was merely procedural.52 This characterization of
the requirements for appeal of the State Engineer's decision allowed a
review on the merits rather than foreclosing such review. The court held
that due process requirements are satisfied with service, thus giving the
court jurisdiction. 3 Filing proof of service had no effect upon the court's
4
jurisdiction, as long as the service itself was timely.
The court of appeals again distinguished between procedural and sub45. 100 N.M. at 776, 676 P.2d at 1341.
46. Id.
47. 101 N.M. 157, 679 P.2d 825 (1984).
48. Id. at 158, 679 P.2d at 826.
49. Id.
50. 101 N.M. 579, 686 P.2d 269 (Ct.App. 1984).
51. Id. at 581, 686 P.2d at 271.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 582, 686 P.2d at 272.
54. Id.
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stantive requirements for district court jurisdiction in Trujillo v. Puro."
The court held that the failure to present specific claims to the Medical
Review Commission in a medical malpractice action did not defeat the
trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.56 The plaintiff presented a statement of the facts, naming the persons involved.57 The court ruled that it
was unnecessary for the plaintiff to present each count or claim to the
commission. The district court had jurisdiction over the medical malpractice claims once the plaintiff complied with the requirements of the
Medical Malpractice Act.58
This year, the New Mexico courts broadly interpreted the scope of
original subject matter jurisdiction in the district courts. It is clear, .however, that the appellate courts are much less willing to be deferential to
district court jurisdiction once the district court's original jurisdiction has
been extinguished by an appeal. In those cases, district court jurisdiction
is confined to the precise limits specified in the remand order.
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The supreme court gave expansive interpretation to the scope of New
Mexico's long-arm statute in Kathrein v. Parkview Meadows, Inc.59 In
Kathrein, a New Mexico resident sued the defendant, a Minnesota corporation operating a Wickenburg, Arizona alcoholism treatment center in
which the plaintiff's husband had enrolled, for personal injury. The program included a "Family Week," in which the individual and his family
participated in therapy sessions.
The plaintiff alleged that her participation in Family Week caused her
to suffer continual severe emotional and psychological trauma, as well
as lost income, medical expenses, and future medical expenses. The
complaint alleged that the defendant was negligent in soliciting the plaintiff's attendance at Family Week because the defendant knew that the
plaintiff would be confronted with a psychologically and emotionally
stressful environment, but had failed to obtain the plaintiff's medical
history. The complaint did not allege that the plaintiff suffered the injury
in New Mexico, but founded its allegation of jurisdiction on the defendant's "transaction of any business" within the state."°
55. 101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1984).
56. Id. at 410, 683 P.2d at 965.
57. The Medical Malpractice Act requires that the plaintiff's application to the Medical Review
Commission contain "a brief statement of the facts of the case, naming the persons involved, the
dates and the circumstances, so far as they are known, of the alleged act or acts of malpractice."
N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-5-15(B)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
58. 101 N.M. at 410, 683 P.2d at 965.
59. N.M. -. , 691 P.2d 462 (1984). New Mexico's long-arm statute is codified at N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16 (1978).
60. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §38-1-16(A)(1) (1978).
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The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise
61
from an act specified by New Mexico's long-arm statute. The trial court
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals reversed, finding no relationship between the defendant's activities in New
Mexico and the plaintiff's cause of action.62
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. The supreme court
63
focused on the defendant's activities in New Mexico, and concluded
that they were "of sufficient magnitude" to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the New Mexico courts.6' Having established that the defend6
ant's activities within the state were "continuous and purposeful," the
court found that the constitutional due process "minimum contacts" standard of InternationalShoe was met.' The court then equated New Mexico's statutory standard for obtaining long-arm jurisdiction with the due
process "minimum contacts" standard and enumerated various factors to
be considered in determining whether a non-resident defendant transacted
business in the state. These factors include "the voluntariness of the
defendant's contact with the state, the nature of the transaction, the applicability of New Mexico law, the contemplation of the parties, and the
location of likely witnesses." 67 Emphasizing that the applicability of the
68
long-arm statute "must be determined by the facts in each case," the
court found that the defendant's "total activities" in New Mexico were
sufficient to justify subjecting the defendant to the jurisdiction of the New
Mexico courts.69
The court of appeals addressed a similar issue but reached a different
70
conclusion in Swindle v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. In 1981,
the plaintiff had signed a retail installment contract to purchase an au61. The defendant's statutory agent in Arizona was served with process. Because service was not
obtained under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-6 (1978), jurisdiction had to be established under New
N.M. at -, 691 P.2d at 463.
Mexico's long-arm statute. 62. "The long-arm statute requires a close relationship between jurisdictional activities and a
N.M. at -, 691 P.2d at 462-63.
cause of action." 63. Defendant advertised its alcoholism treatment center in the yellow pages of the Albuquerque
telephone directory, had contacted the director of the Albuquerque affiliate of the National Council
on Alcoholism to solicit his referral of patients to the treatment center, had mailed a brochure to the
plaintiff inviting her to attend Family Week, and had telephoned the plaintiff to encourage her
691 P.2d at 463.
attendance. Id. at -,
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
, 691 P.2d at 464.
N.M. at
67. 68. Id. (quoting Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 88 N.M. 532, 534, 543 P.2d 825, 827 (1975)).
N.M. at -, 691 P.2d at 464. Justice Stowers dissented, agreeing with the rationale of
69. the court of appeals, and finding that the plaintiff had not established any relationship between the
defendant's activities in New Mexico and her cause of action. Id. (Stowers, J., dissenting).
70. 101 N.M. 126, 679 P.2d 268 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 77, 678 P.2d 705 (1984).
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tomobile from Bill Swad Chevrolet, Inc. ("Swad"). The contract was
signed in Columbus, Ohio, where the plaintiff was then a resident. Swad
requested the plaintiff to sign a second installment contract, apparently
because of mathematical errors in the first contract, but assured her that
there would be no changes in the substantive terms of the parties' agreement. After signing the second contract, the plaintiff moved to New
Mexico, and the contract was transferred from the General Motors Acceptance Corp. ("GMAC") office in Ohio to a New Mexico GMAC
office.
There were material differences in the second contract,71 but the plaintiff
did not discover them until September 1982. She then filed suit against
Swad and GMAC in Bernalillo County District Court. Swad moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and after discovery, the trial
court granted Swad's motion. The court of appeals affirmed.
The plaintiff argued that the New Mexico court had jurisdiction under
the long-arm statute, either because Swad had transacted business in New
Mexico or because it had committed a tortious act here. Analyzing both
claims under the due-process "minimum contacts" standard articulated
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,7 2 the court of appeals concluded that Swad's contacts with New Mexico were insufficient to satisfy
that standard.73 Swad had never been authorized to do business in New
Mexico, had never done business in New Mexico, had not advertised in
New Mexico, and had no employees, agents, or facilities in New Mexico.74 Furthermore, Swad had not purposely availed itself of the privilege
of conducting activities in New Mexico.7 5 Finally, the court refused, on
constitutional grounds, to rely on Roberts v. PiperAircraft Corp.76 to find
that Swad had committed a tortious act in New Mexico:
To classify Swindle's continued liability on her contract as sufficient
injury committed within New Mexico under Roberts would expand
our long-arm statute beyond constitutional due process limits. New
Mexico cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant solely on the basis of a plaintiff's residency at the time of
the lawsuit.77
The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's grant of Swad's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
71. The second contract included a higher cash price, a higher total finance charge, a higher
deferred payment price, and higher monthly installment payments and represented the automobile
as "Used" rather than "New." 101 N.M. at 127, 679 P.2d at 269.
72. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
73. 101 N.M. at 128, 679 P.2d at 270.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 100 N.M. 363, 670 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1983).
77. 101 N.M. at 128-29, 679 P.2d at 270-71.
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Despite the apparent dissimilarity in their results, both Kathrein and
Swindle were, at least arguably, correctly decided. The courts in both
cases analyzed the out-of-state defendants' contacts with New Mexico in
reviewing the jurisdictional challenges. In so doing, the courts demonstrated that careful attention to the magnitude of the defendant's actions
in New Mexico will be required in determining whether the New Mexico
courts have personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.
In addition to addressing the scope of New Mexico's long-arm statute,
the court of appeals further defined the standard for determining the
sufficiency of a challenge attacking the jurisdiction of the court in Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co. v. Bendix Control Division.7" The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiff's complaint had not shown sufficient minimum contacts to support personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that the defendant's unverified motion to dismiss, not supported by affidavits or other sworn testimony, was insufficient to constitute a proper
challenge to the plaintiff's allegations of jurisdictional facts. 79 Although
the court acknowledged that upon a proper challenge to the court's jurisdiction the burden shifts to the plaintiff to support his allegation that
personal jurisdiction over the defendant is present, the court added substance to the requirement that the defendant present a "proper challenge"
before that burden would shift to the plaintiff. The court emphasized that
"a proper challenge must contain something in addition to the bare allegations of the motion."' 0 A statement by the defendant, under oath by
affidavit or verification of the motion, setting forth or verifying acts which
support the defendant's claim of lack of minimum contacts would have
been sufficient."1 The legal arguments of counsel were deemed not to be
"evidence" and could not constitute evidentiary support for the motion
to dismiss.82
The Bendix court reaffirmed the trend begun in Plumbers Specialty
Supply Co. v. EnterpriseProducts Co.,3 where the court expressed "reservations" about forcing the plaintiff to establish a portion of his substantive case before trial.' The court of appeals thus established a procedure
78. 101 N.M. 235, 680 P.2d 616 (Ct. App. 1984). The plaintiff appealed from an order dismissing
its amended complaint, which sought reimbursement for worker's compensation benefits paid to Val
Montoya, the involuntary plaintiff.
79. Id. at 240-41, 680 P.2d at 621-22. The court reiterated the principle that an allegation of a
tortious act in New Mexico is sufficient to support an inference of minimum contacts. Id. at 240,
680 P.2d at 621.
80. Id. at 240, 680 P.2d at 621.
81. Id. Such proof would satisfy N.M. R. Civ. P. 7(b), which requires a motion to "state with
particularity the grounds therefor."
82. 101 N.M. at 240, 680 P.2d at 621.
83. 96 N.M. 517, 632 P.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1981).
84. Id. at 520, 632 P.2d at 755.
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that effectively circumvents the requirement that the plaintiff prove his
jurisdictional allegations upon a challenge by the defendant. 85 After Bendix, defendants will have to be prepared to come forward with evidence
that personal jurisdiction is lacking before the plaintiff will be forced to
support his allegations.

IV. JUDGE SELECTION
On March 1, 1984, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided State ex
rel. Gesswein v. Galvan" and issued new rules governing the disqualification of judges in both civil and criminal proceedings.8 7 In Gesswein,
the court addressed the issue of whether a district judge could be disqualified and to what extent New Mexico court rules and statutes enlarge
or abridge the right to disqualify as established in the state constitution.
The court recognized that the New Mexico Constitution guarantees the
right to a fair and impartial tribunal by presuming the existence of partiality under specified circumstances:
No justice, judge or magistrate of any court shall, except by consent
of all parties, sit in any cause in which either of the parties are related
to him by affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin,
or in which he was counsel, or in the trial of which he presided in
any inferior court, or in which he has an interest. 88
The court then emphasized that the "interest" necessary to disqualify a
judge specified in the constitution "includes actual bias or prejudice, not
some indirect, remote, speculative theoretical or possible interest" 9
The court examined the judicial disqualification statute' to determine
whether it constituted substantive or procedural law. If procedural, the
court could modify or suspend it by rule. In earlier cases, the court had
held that the statutory right to disqualify was substantive. 9 The court
emphasized, however, the subtlety of the distinction between substantive
and procedural law and determined that the statute merely provided a
method of disqualification which was procedural in nature and therefore
85. That requirement was established by the New Mexico Supreme Court in State ex rel. Anaya
v. Columbia Research Corp., 92 N.M. 104, 583 P.2d 468 (1978).
86. 100 N.M. 769, 676 P.2d 1334 (1984). See also Slusher, Criminal Procedure, 15 N.M.L.
Rev. (1985), in this issue for a discussion of the applicability of Gesswein to criminal cases.
87. The new rules are designated as N.M. R. Civ. P. 88 and 88.1 and N.M. R. Crim. P. 34.1
and 34.2.
88. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 18.
89. 100 N.M. at 770, 676 P.2d at 1335.
90. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978).
91. See Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (1978); Beall v. Reidy, 80 N.M. 444,
457 P.2d 376 (1969); State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511 (1933).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

a prerogative of the state supreme court.92 The court held that "this Court
can adopt a rule of procedure when the operation of the court is involved
and the existing process has created 4 problem." 93 The court retracted
existing rules governing judicial disqualification and substituted new rules. 4
The new rules became effective March 5, 1984. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88
governs designation of judges, and N.M. R. Civ. P. 88.1 governs disqualification of judges. Rule 88 allows local district court rules to govern
the initial designation of judges.9 5 In multi-judge districts, whenever a
judge is disqualified or recuses himself, local district court rules will
govern the assignment of the case to another judge, unless the parties
agree on a substitute judge within seven days, and that judge agrees to
hear the case.96 If the case cannot be reassigned to another judge, that
fact will be certified to the Chief Justice of the New Mexico Supreme
Court, who will designate a judge.97 That designated judge may only be
disqualified pursuant to article VI, section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution.98
Rule 88.1 provides that no party may disqualify more than one judge."
To disqualify a judge, a party must file an affidavit of disqualification
with the court clerk within ten days after service of process on the defendant. " The affidavit of disqualification must state sufficient facts showing
the bias, prejudice, or interest of the judge being disqualified, and must
be accompanied by a certificate of counsel stating that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief, the facts contained in the affidavit
are true and correct.'' The clerk will then give written notice to each
party. Within ten days of that notice, any other party who wishes to
92. 100 N.M. at 772, 676 P.2d at 1337. The court cited Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting,
Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 310, 551 P.2d 1354, 1357 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
93. 100 N.M. at 772, 676 P.2d at 1337. The court cited the 1981-1982 Annual Report of the
Judicial Department as evidence of the problem. Over 2,000 judicial disqualifications had been filed
during the course of the year of the report. The court found this number of judicial disqualifications
to constitute an "unreasonable burden" on the system. 100 N.M. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338.
94. 100 N.M. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338. The court promulgated new rules governing judge
selection and disqualification in both civil and criminal proceedings. This Survey addresses only
those rules dealing with civil procedure.
95. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88(a).
96. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88(b).
97. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88(c).
98. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88(d). N.M. Const. art. VI, § 18 is quoted supra text accompanying note
88.
99. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88. 1(b). This restriction raises a constitutional problem if a party has valid
constitutional grounds on which to challenge more than one judge. For example, if a party challenges
an appellate judge on the grounds that he sat on the same case while a trial court judge, and the
judge who is subsequently assigned the case is the party's first cousin, that party would have a valid
constitutional challenge for the second, as well as the first judge. Under Rule 88. 1(b) it appears that
he is foreclosed from making the second challenge.
100. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88.1(c).
101. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88.1(f).
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disqualify any other judge who might hear the case must file a provisional
affidavit of disqualification naming the judge to be disqualified." 2 The
contents of the provisional affidavit are subject to the same standards
specified for affidavits of disqualification.
As a practical matter, the new judicial disqualification rules will eliminate the disqualification of judges. °3 Although Rule 88.1 appears to
allow parties to disqualify judges, challengers are now limited to the
grounds for disqualification enumerated in the New Mexico Constitution.
These grounds will restrict the judge-shopping rampant under the former
Rule. Practitioners who are unable to demonstrate a judge's bias will
have to explore alternative avenues of judge selection." °6
V. PLEADINGS
A. Real Party In Interest
The New Mexico Supreme Court once again attempted to clarify the
law regarding joinder and naming insurance companies as parties in Safeco Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.0 5
The case arose out of an automobile accident in which Kim Taylor's car
collided with a car driven by Nicholas Calomino and another car driven
by Richard Vigil, but owned by Eugene Vigil. Taylor was insured by the
defendant ("USF&G"), Calomino was insured by Safeco, and the Vigils
were uninsured. USF&G paid the bulk of Taylor's damages and then
sued Calomino, Safeco, and the Vigils on a subrogation theory, naming
Taylor an involuntary plaintiff to the extent of her $100 deductible. The
trial court dismissed Safeco, but the court of appeals, citing earlier New
Mexico decisions, reversed the trial court and required that Safeco be
joined as a party defendant."
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. 7 The court acknowledged that previous decisions had "unnecessarily confused" the question
of determining those parties who must be joined to permit the proper
maintenance of a lawsuit, with the fear that disclosure of insurance at
102. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88.1(d).
103. As this issue goes to press, however, the legislature has just passed a bill which would
permit each party to any civil or criminal action to exercise one peremptory disqualification of a
judge. The bill is awaiting the governor's signature.
104. Moving for a change of venue or dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens might serve
as alternative methods of judge selection.
105. 101 N.M. 148, 679 P.2d 816 (1984). In doing so, the supreme court did not write on a
clean slate. See Dow, Insurance Law, 15 N.M.L. Rev. -. (1985), in this issue for a discussion of
the New Mexico cases preceding Safeco.
106. 101 N.M. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817. The court of appeals relied on Maurer v. Thorpe, 95
N.M. 286, 621 P.2d 503 (1980); Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957); and
Campbell v. Benson, 97 N.M. 147, 637 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1981).
107. 101 N.M. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817.
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trial might result in prejudice to an insurer or an insured party. 0 8 The
court therefore declared that the rules of civil procedure would continue
to govern joinder of parties, " but further declared that the fact of an
insurance company's joinder would not be disclosed to the jury."' The
insured party would assert his claim for all damages against the party or
parties who allegedly caused the harm, including any amounts due his
insurer by subrogation. Once the injured party recovered damages, the
insurer would then be allowed to prove its subrogation claim to the trial
court, and the court would apportion the recovery between the insured
and his insurer."' Safeco thus reaffirmed the New Mexico Supreme Court's
intention to be guided by the rules of civil procedure while providing for
non-disclosure of the fact of insurance when insurance companies actively
participate as parties.
The court of appeals strictly construed the standard for determining a
real party in interest for purposes of appeal in St. Sauver v. New Mexico
Peterbilt, Inc." 2 In St. Sauver, the plaintiff brought a negligence action
for damages arising out of a car accident that occurred on a state road
within the boundaries of the Zia Indian Pueblo. The named defendants
included, among others, the New Mexico State Highway Department
("NMSHD") and Juan Medina, an enrolled member of the Zia Pueblo.
Medina filed a motion to dismiss, which was uncontested by the plaintiff,
but was contested by NMSHD. "3 The trial court granted Medina's motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and NMSHD appealed.
The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that NMSHD
lacked standing." 4
The court cited N.M. Civ. App. R. 3(a), which provides that "any
party aggrieved" may appeal from a final order or judgment. To be
"aggrieved," the party must have a personal or pecuniary interest or
property right adversely affected by the judgment; " that interest must be
"immediate, pecuniary, and substantial, not nominal or a remote con108. Id. at 149-50, 679 P.2d at 817-18.
109. Id. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817. The court cited N.M. R. Civ. P.17, 19 and 21, as applicable
to joinder of parties. Id.
110. 101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818. In dissent, Justice Stowers strongly disagreed with the
majority's insistence on keeping secret the involvement of the insurance company: "Once properly
joined, a party should not be given a special non-disclosed status." Id. at 153, 679 P.2d at 821.
111. Id. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818. The court reversed the earlier New Mexico decisions, insofar
as they were inconsistent with its approach. Id.
112. 101 N.M. 84, 678 P.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1984).
113. Medina's motion to dismiss was based on lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at85, 678 P.2d at713.
114. Id.
115. Id. at85-86, 678 P.2d at 713-14 (citing Ruidoso State Bank v.Brumlow, 81 N.M. 379,
467 P.2d 395 (1970)).
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6 NMSHD had
sequence of judgment. "'"
argued that it would be aggrieved
if the trial court applied the doctrine of joint and several liability to the
action after dismissing Medina." 7 The court of appeals rejected NMSHD's
argument, explaining that NMSHD's interest in Medina's dismissal depended on subsequent events at trial that might not occur and that NMSHD
had suffered no present injury as a result of Medina's dismissal." 8 The
harm was both remote and contingent; it, therefore, was insufficient to
support standing.

B. Amendment
The New Mexico Supreme Court reaffirmed its policy of liberally
permitting amendment of pleadings in FirstNational Bank of Santa Fe
v. Southwest Yacht & Marine Supply Corp."9 The court addressed the
amendment of an affidavit of replevin and held that the amended affidavit
related back to the date of the original affidavit. 1o The plaintiff bank had
attempted to replevy goods pledged as security for the payment of a
note. 2'The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dissolve the writ
of replevin, because the affidavit of replevin did not comply with the
New Mexico replevin statute. 22
' The trial court, however, did grant leave
to the plaintiff to amend the affidavit.' 23 The bank amended its affidavit
and moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that the amended
affidavit had cured the defects in the original affidavit. The trial court
found that the amended affidavit did not relate back and, therefore, did
not cure the defects in the original affidavit.
Reversing the trial court, the supreme court noted that amendments to
pleadings are favored when amendment is in the interest of justice.124
116. 101 N.M. at 86, 678 P.2d at 714 (citing Leoke v. County of San Bern dino, 57 Cal. Rptr.
770, 249 Cal. App. 2d 767 (1967)).
117. 101 N.M. at 86, 678 P.2d at 714. NMSHD was also concerned that, as a practical matter,
Medina might be immune from suit because "some Indian reservations lack a formal court structure
and a well-defined body of law to apply to tort cases." Id. at 87, 678 P.2d at 715. The court of
appeals refused to read Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982), as creating a general exception to the
rejection of joint and several liability for immune tortfeasors. 101 N.M. at 87, 678 P.2d at 715.
118. 101 N.M. at 87, 678 P.2d at 715.
119. 101 N.M. 431, 684 P.2d 517 (1984).
120. Id. at 434, 684 P.2d at 520.
121. The other claims involved in this suit are not discussed in this Article. The constitutionality
of the replevin statute, as well as the available remedies for wrongful replevin, are discussed at
length in the opinion, but do not bear on the relation back of the amended affidavit.
122. 101 N.M. at 434, 684 P.2d at 520. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§42-8-1 to -22 (1978).
123. After a writ of replevin has been quashed, amendment may be made to cure a defect in the
affidavit of replevin. The amendments can be made whenever an ordinary pleading could be amended.
101 N.M. at 434, 684 P.2d at 520. See also N.M. Stat. Ann. §42-9-14 (1978).
124. 101 N.M. at 434, 684 P.2d at 520.
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Amendments in replevin actions are also liberally permitted.' 25 Amendments to pleadings relate back to the date of the original pleading
"[wihenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to. be
'
Therefore, the amended affidavit
set forth in the original pleading." 126
'
related back to the date of the original affidavit. 27
The court apparently decided that its policy of favoring amendments
to affidavits of replevin in conjunction with N.M. R. Civ. P. 15 led so
inexorably to its decision that it did not offer a detailed explanation of
its rationale. The court merely applied the "cited statutes and case law
to the facts in the present case . . .[and found] that the amended affidavit
did relate back to the time of the filing of the original affidavit in replevin." 128
In contrast to the supreme court's liberal stance in Southwest Yacht,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals refused to construe the term "representative" liberally to allow an amended complaint to relate back to the
original complaint in Mackey v. Burke. 29 In Mackey, Mr. and Mrs. Mackey,
the parents of an infant daughter, filed an action for compensatory and
punitive damages based on malpractice arising from the medical treatment
of their daughter before her death. In their initial complaint they had filed
"individually and as the natural parents" of the deceased, but in their
amended complaint they added Mr. Mackey as a party plaintiff in his
capacity as their daughter's personal representative. The trial court entered
summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiffs'
amended complaint did not relate back to their earlier defective complaint
and, therefore, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
In determining that the initial complaint was defective, the court of
appeals focused on the .term "representative," as it appears both in the
Medical Malpractice Act 3 ° and the Wrongful Death Act.' The court
acknowledged that the term "representative," as it appears in the Medical
Malpractice Act, has a broader meaning than "personal representative,"
but also pointed out that the broader meaning existed only for the purpose
of covering situations where the patient was not dead, but unable to
pursue the suit personally.'3 2 Because the infant in this case was dead,
125. Id. See also Vigil v. Johnson, 60 N.M. 273, 291 P.2d 312 (1955).
126. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15.
127. 101 N.M. at434, 684 P.2d at520.
128. Id.
129. 23 N.M.Bar Bull. 474 (Ct.App. May 3, 1984), cert. quashed, 24 N.M. Bar Bull. 65 (Jan.
31, 1985).
Ann. §§41-5-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
130. N.M. Stat.
131. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2-1 to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). The act provides that a suit for wrongful
death "shall be brought by and in the name or names of the personal representative or representatives
of such deceased person." Id. § 41-2-3.
132. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. at 476.
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the court found this definition inapplicable and referred instead to the
term "representative" as defined in the Wrongful Death Act. 33 Under
that statute, the court distinguished between a "personal representative"
and a "statutory beneficiary": "Status as a potential statutory beneficiary
is not the test for authority to bring a wrongful death action. If each
potential beneficiary was considered a personal representative, the suits
could be unending and contradictory.",134
The court referred to N.M. R. Civ. P. 17 and declared that, under the
wrongful death statute, the real party in interest is the personal representative.' 35 Because the parents did not meet the test for real parties in
interest articulated in L.R. Property Management, Inc. v. Grebe,'36 the
court of appeals found that they did not have the right to enforce the
action until a personal representative had been named. 31 7 Finding that the
amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, the court
of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. 38
This year, the supreme court also looked at the effect an amendment
to a complaint has on the running of the three-year period within which
a complaint must be prosecuted. 39
' In Fidelity NationalBank v. Collier, "
the plaintiff amended its complaint to add additional defendants, including
the appellees, the Thomases, and an additional cause of action. Both
causes of action were for foreclosures on separate mortgages in favor of
the plaintiff as security for a loan to the same businesses. In the first
complaint, the plaintiff only attempted to foreclose on the mortgage held
by the original defendants. The Thomases were not necessary parties in
that action. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff attempted to foreclose
133.

Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 478. The court of appeals discussed this section of the Wrongful Death Act in
Dominguez v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 605, 673 P.2d 1338 (Ct. App. 1983). In that case, the court held
that the statute did not confer an unconditional right to intervene, but rather, that the requirement
of N.M. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) had to be satisfied. That rule allows intervention of right if the party
(1) claims an interest relating to the action and (2) shows that his ability to protect that interest
would be impaired or impeded as a practical matter, unless existing parties adequately represent his
interest. In Dominguez, the court found that the plaintiff, the decedent's natural father, had established
a prima facie showing that he had an "interest" as required by the rule, but failed to show inadequate
representation by the deceased's natural mother, her personal representative as required by the
Wrongful Death Act. The court of appeals, therefore, affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's
motion to intervene. 100 N.M. at 608, 673 P.2d at 1341.
136. 96 N.M. 22, 627 P.2d 864 (1981). "A real party in interest is 'determined by whether one
is the owner of the right being enforced and is in a position to discharge the defendant from the
liability being asserted in the suit."' Id. at 23, 627 P.2d at 865 (quoting Jesko v. Stauffer Chem.
Co., 89 N.M. 786, 790, 558 P.2d 55, 59 (Ct. App. 1976)).
137. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. at 478.
138. Id. at 479.
139. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 41(e). If the plaintiff does not prosecute within three years, the defendant
may move to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute.
140. 101 N.M. 273, 681 P.2d 58 (1984).
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on the Thomases' separate mortgage and to recover the full amount of
the debt guaranteed by the Thomases.
The plaintiff settled with all of the defendants except the Thomases.
Three years after the original complaint was filed, but two weeks short
of three years after the complaint was amended to include them, the
41
Thomases filed a motion to dismiss, relying on N.M. R. Civ. P. 41(e).'
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. The
New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, stating that the three-year period
began to run at the time the amended complaint was filed because the
amended complaint included a different cause of action against the Thom42

ases. 1

The court noted that, although the claims against the original defendants
and the Thomases arose out of the same series of transactions, the mortgages were separate and the plaintiff was attempting to collect the full
amount of the debt based upon separate guarantees. Because the mortgages and the guarantees were separate, and neither party would have
been a necessary party to the other action if the causes of action had been
separated, the court held that the claims against the Thomases were causes
of action separate from those against the original defendants.' 43 As a
result, the three-year period started to run in favor of the Thomases when
the amended complaint was filed. The court reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded the cause because the period had not expired when
the Thomases filed their Rule 41(e) motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute. "
VI. DISCOVERY
The recent appellate cases concerning discovery have dealt primarily
with the propriety of imposing sanctions for the failure to comply with
discovery orders. In Lehman v. Wilson, 45 the plaintiff obtained a jury
verdict of $424,300 against the defendant in a personal injury suit arising
from an accident in which the plaintiff ran into the back of the defendant's
141. The Thomases claimed that the plaintiff had not taken any steps to end the case since it filed
the original complaint three years earlier. Id. at 274, 681 P.2d at 59.
142. 101 N.M. at 275, 681 P.2d at 60. The running of the period in which a case must be
prosecuted is the same for all defendants, regardless of when the defendants were added to the
complaint, only if the cause of action against an additional defendant is the same as the cause of
action against the original defendants. Normally, the three-year period will start to run when the
original complaint is filed. Id. at 274, 681 P.2d at 59. See also Morris v. Fitzgerald, 73 N.M. 56,
385 P.2d 574 (1963).
143. 101 N.M. at 275, 681 P.2d at 60.
144. Id.
145. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. 182 (Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1984). This opinion was officially withdrawn
by the New Mexico Supreme Court after it granted certiorari, and the parties agreed on a settlement.
This case, therefore, is not presented here for its precedential significance, but rather for its inherent
interest.
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tractor-trailer. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's failure to maintain
adequate rear lighting on his vehicle proximately caused the accident.
During discovery, the defendant was requested to produce the tractortrailer for inspection and testing of the taillights. When less stringent
methods failed, the court orally ordered production of the tractor-trailer.
When the truck was finally produced, new taillights and wiring had been
installed.
The plaintiff moved for discovery sanctions under N.M. R. Civ. P. 37
and, at a motion hearing, the trial court found that the defendant had
"negligently and/or intentionally" removed the taillights and wiring from
the truck, causing irreparable harm to the evidence.4 " As a sanction, the
trial court instructed the jury that, as a matter of law, the defendant was
47
guilty of negligence because of his failure to have operative taillights. '
The defendant appealed from the trial court's action on three bases: (1)
that an oral order is an insufficient basis on which to impose discovery
sanctions; (2) that the trial court's finding of negligent or willful destruction of evidence was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) that
the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sanction establishing
negligence as a matter of law.' 48
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. The court first held that
an oral order was a sufficient basis for the imposition of discovery sanc49
tions, as long as the requirement of "chargeable knowledge" was met. '
The court pointed out that federal courts had held that discovery sanctions
could be imposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 for violation of oral orders
and found the federal rule "substantially similar to the New Mexico
rule. "' so
Reviewing the defendant's second claim of error, the court emphasized
that it would apply an even stricter standard of review than "substantial
evidence" when reviewing lower court imposition of discovery sanctions.
The appellate court would reverse the lower court only if "the appellate
court has a 'definite and firm conviction that the court below committed
a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing
of the relevant factors."""' Upon review of the "full record," the court
146. Id. at 183.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 184. "[One who is chargeable with knowledge of an oral order exposes himself to
contempt proceedings if the order is disobeyed." Id. (citing State v. Sanders, 96 N.M. 138, 628
P.2d 1134 (Ct. App. 1981)).
150. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. at 184. The court cited Penthouse Int'l., Ltd. v. Playboy Enters., 663
F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1981), and Henry v. Sneiders, 490 F.2d 315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
832 (1974).
151. Id. (quoting United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 203, 629 P.2d
231, 279 (1980)).
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of appeals refused to find that the trial court had committed a "clear error
of judgment. " 52
Addressing the defendant's third claim, that the trial court had abused
its discretion by establishing negligence as a matter of law and imposing
its finding as a discovery sanction, the court of appeals affirmed the
applicability of the standard articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Societe Internationale v. Rogers'5 3 and cited in United Nuclear
Corp. v. GeneralAtomic Co. ' a discovery sanction that entails the denial
of an opportunity to be heard on the merits may only be imposed when
the failure to comply with discovery orders is due to the willfulness, bad
faith, or fault of the disobedient party. 55 Because the discovery sanction
imposed in this case denied the defendant the opportunity to have an
important issue determined on its merits, the court of appeals ruled that
the Rogers standard was applicable. Nevertheless, the court held that the
defendant's negligence and deliberate replacement of allegedly faulty
equipment constituted sufficient "fault" to justify the sanction: "Since
the negligent or intentional conduct found by the trial court constitutes
sufficient 'willfulness' or 'fault,' and because the sanction imposed was
tailored to defendant's failure to comply with the discovery ordered, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in fitting the penalty to the circumstance. "156
Similarly, in Thornfield v. First State Bank, 57 the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's entry of a default judgment against the plaintiff
for failure to comply with the trial court's order compelling discovery. "
The court found that the plaintiff's action supported the trial court's
finding of willfulness, although the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith.' 59
Unable to find a default judgment to be an inappropriate sanction, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.
152. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. at 184.
153. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
154. 96 N.M. 155, 202, 629 P.2d 231, 238 (1980).
155. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. at 185. This standard was reaffirmed inPittard v.Four Seasons Motor
N.M.-., 688 P.2d 333 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 963
Inn, Inc., (1984) (no abuse of discretion in trial court's refusal to direct a verdict or enter a default judgment
against the defendant absent a willful or bad faith failure to comply with a discovery order).
156. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. at 185 (emphasis in original).
157. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. 80 (Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1984), cert. granted, 23 N.M. Bar Bull. 953
(Sept. 13, 1984).
158. Id. at83.
159. Id. at 82. Despite a court order requiring the plaintiff to complete discovery obligations
within five days, the plaintiff made only a partial response to interrogatories after eight days and no
response whatever to the court's request for production. Furthermore, the plaintiff acknowledged
that he had not fulfilled discovery requirements at the final hearing. Id.
160. Id. at 83.
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VII. JURY TRIAL
A district court withdrew legal issues from a jury on the grounds that
there were also equitable issues involved in Peay v. Ortega,' 6' but the
New Mexico Supreme Court disapproved of the trial court's action. The
plaintiff brought an action for specific performance of a real estate agreement and for damages. The parties agreed to try the case before a jury,
and the trial court ordered a jury trial pursuant to that stipulation and
N.M. R. Civ. P. 39(b). After two days of testimony, however, the trial
judge, having determined that the issues were equitable, discharged the
jury and proceeded to try the case and enter judgment for the defendants.
The plaintiffs appealed, and the supreme court reversed. The court held
that once the parties consented to try an issue before a jury and the court
ordered a jury trial, the trial court could not then withdraw the legal issues
62
from the jury on the grounds that equitable issues were also involved '
In another case involving issues relevant to jury trials, Sewell v. Wilson, 63
' the New Mexico Court of Appeals examined a trial court's grant
of extra peremptory challenges in a medical malpractice action. In Sewell,
three doctors were named co-defendants. The trial court had granted one
of the doctors, Dr. Gerety, five separate peremptory challenges in addition
to the five joint challenges for the other two doctors, based on his "antagonism of interest" with them.64 The plaintiff claimed error in awarding
the five additional peremptory challenges, and although the court of appeals reversed on other grounds, it addressed the issue, assuming that
the issue would again arise on retrial.
The court found that the interests of Dr. Gerety were antagonistic to
those of the other two doctors for several reasons. First, Dr. Gerety had
filed a separate answer, raising the affirmative defenses of independent
intervening cause and the negligence of others. 65
' The court also focused
on the dissimilarity between the acts of negligence attributed to the different defendants. Unlike his co-defendants, Dr. Gerety was not accused
of negligence in prescribing drugs. The court pointed out that when
161. 101 N.M. 564, 686 P.2d 254 (1984).
162. Id. at 565, 686 P.2d at 255. The court relied on N.M. R. Civ. P. 39(b) and Evans Fin.
Corp. v. Strasser, 99 N.M. 788, 664 P.2d 986 (1983), to support its conclusion that the jury was
entitled to try the material issues of fact inherent in the legal issues. 101 N.M. at 565, 686 P.2d at
255.
163. 101 N.M. 486, 684 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App. 1984).
164. Id. at 491-92, 684 P.2d at 1156-57. Peremptory challenges are governed by N.M. R. Civ.
P.38(e).
165. 101 N.M. at 492, 684 P.2d at 1157. The court also noted that shortly after certiorari was
denied in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982), Dr. Gerety retained separate counsel. 101 N.M.
at 492, 684 P.2d at 1157.
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different independent acts of negligence are alleged in a suit governed
by comparative negligence, multiple defendants will almost always have
antagonistic interests, thereby justifying additional peremptory challenges."6 The court thus gave back-handed credence to the defendants'
argument that the combination of comparative negligence and the abolition of joint and several liability guarantees that multiple defendants
will automatically seek to establish each others' liability.' 67
The court of appeals also addressed the correct procedure for dealing
with inconsistencies in special verdicts in Lehman v. Wilson.6 That
negligence case was submitted to the jury on general verdict and special
interrogatory forms. The jury returned inconsistent answers to the special
verdict questions, as it found that plaintiff's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident, yet attributed 27.5% of the fault to the
plaintiff. The jury did not complete the general verdict form. During the
ensuing discussion between the trial judge and counsel, the jury foreman
stated that although the jury had been confused about the definition of
"proximate cause," it had arrived at the damage figure of $424,300 by
reducing total damages by the 27.5% it had attributed to plaintiff's negligence. The trial judge then entered judgment for the plaintiff in that
amount.169
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court judgment. 7 ' The court
pointed out that the special verdicts seemed inconsistent because of the
jury's failure to return a general verdict. N.M. R. Civ. P. 49(b), therefore,
was inapplicable to the situation presented. 17 The court then addressed
Rule 49(a), which refers only to special verdicts. The court pointed out
that the rule does not require that the jury return to the jury room for
reconsideration or that the trial court grant a new trial in the event of
special verdict inconsistencies. 172 Instead, in the absence of specific direction in the rules of civil procedure, the trial judge questioned the jury
foreman to ascertain the jury's intent. ' The court approved this method
of reconciling the inconsistencies in the special verdict answers:
166. 101 N.M. at 493, 684 P.2d at 1158. The court quoted Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 170
(Wyo. 1981).
167. 101 N.M. at 492, 684 P.2d at 1157.
168. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. 182 (Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1984). For a more complete discussion of the
facts of this case, see supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
As indicated supra note 145, this opinion was withdrawn by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
It is discussed, therefore, for its interesting treatment of this issue, and not for its precedential value.
169. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. at 188.
170. Id. at 191.
171. Id. at 189-90. The court pointed out that N.M. R. Civ. P. 49(b) was addressed at general
verdicts accompanied by special interrogatories. Because no general verdict form was completed,
this section of the rule was inapplicable.
172. N.M. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
173. 23 N.M. Bar Bull. at 190.
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We believe the trial court correctly refused to exalt form over substance, .

.

. and, applying good judicial skills and wisdom, quite

properly reconciled the seeming inconsistencies in the special verdict
answers. To require the jury to return and write down what the
foreman explained to the court and counsel would have been redundant; to require a new trial would be wasteful, dilatory, and heedless
of judicial economy.'74
VIII. POST-TRIAL PROCEDURE

This survey year, the New Mexico appellate courts decided several
cases involving trial court findings of fact. In Whorton v. Mr. C's, "' the
supreme court emphasized that, in a non-jury trial, the trial court is
required to find only those ultimate facts necessary to determine the
issues.' 76 In Whorton, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from
selling wine and beer at restaurants operated by the defendants. The land
titles contained restrictive covenants prohibiting the sale of alcoholic
beverages, but the trial court entered judgment for the defendants, ruling
that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable. The plaintiffs appealed,
arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to adopt several of the
plaintiffs' requested findings of fact, and the supreme court reversed.'
The supreme court held that it was not error for the trial court to refuse
the plaintiffs' requested findings of fact because those were findings of
evidentiary facts, rather than ultimate facts. Furthermore, the trial court
did not err in refusing findings of fact that were not supported by substantial evidence.' 78 Nevertheless, the court reversed, because some of
the findings of fact adopted by the trial court were not supported by
substantial evidence. 79
The court of appeals addressed the timing of filing findings of fact in
McCaffery v. Steward Construction Co. 80 In McCaffery, which involved
a claim for worker's compensation benefits, the parties filed briefs instead
of presenting closing arguments to the court. The plaintiff submitted his
brief and a letter to the judge, stating that he was awaiting the defendants'
brief and the judge's decision before submitting findings and conclusions.
He added that if the judge wished to follow some other procedure, he
should inform the plaintiff. Within a few days of receiving the defendants'
brief, the judge issued a written letter decision which included findings
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. (citation omitted).
100 N.M. 651, 687 P.2d 86 (1984).
Id.at 652-53, 687 P.2d at 87-88.
Id.
Id.at 653, 687 P.2d at 88.
Id.at 655, 687 P.2d at 90.
101 N.M. 51, 678 P.2d 226 (Ct. App. 1984).
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of fact in favor of the defendants, and directed counsel to prepare the
necessary order and submit it to his successor. 8 ' The defendants prepared
a proposed final judgment, which was entered two weeks later when the
plaintiff failed to object.
The plaintiff appealed, claiming that his letter to the judge constituted
a general request to be allowed to file requested findings of fact and
conclusions of law prior to the entry of final judgment. The defendants
argued that the plaintiff had waived specific findings of fact and conclusions of law because he failed to make a proper demand for them and
because he failed to submit requested findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The court interpreted the language of N.M. R. Civ. P. 52(B)(1)(f)
and concluded that the rule was satisfied "if counsel makes a written
request for permission to file findings of fact and conclusions of law to
the trial judge by letter, or by a timely written request . . . provided
counsel subsequently submits requested findings of fact and conclusions
of law in a timely fashion. "1 2 The court determined that the rule did not
require a formal written request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law and, therefore, found that the plaintiff's letter to the judge "was
sufficient to constitute a general request for leave to file requested findings
of fact and conclusions of law." 183
The plaintiff, however, was precluded under Local Rule 20 from submitting requested findings of fact and conclusions of law because more
than ten days had elapsed after the trial court rendered its decision.' 84
The court held that the time began to run once the trial court issued its
letter decision, not when that decision was actually filed in the court
file."8 5 The plaintiff, therefore, waived any objections he might have had
to the sufficiency of the trial court's findings and conclusions.186
In Martinez v. Martinez,"' in contrast, the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff's failure to submit a specific requested conclusion
of law did not constitute waiver of the issue, and therefore, was not fatal
to her claim on appeal. The trial court had informed the parties of its
decision, including its award of attorney's fees to the defendant, by letter
on September 14, 1982. Although final judgment was entered on No181. Id. at 53, 678 P.2d at 228. The trial judge was Judge Philip Baiamonte, who resigned shortly
after his letter decision in this case, which was issued on June 30, 1983. His successor was Judge
Rebecca Sitterly.
182. Id.at 54, 678 P.2d at 229. N.M. R. Civ. P. 52(B)(1)(f) provides that a "party will waive
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law if he fails to make a general request therefor in
writing, or if he fails to tender specific findings and conclusions."
183. 101 N.M. at 55, 678 P.2d at 230.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.at 56, 678 P.2d at 231. See also Crownover v. Nat'l Farmers Union Property and Casualty
Co., 100 N.M. 568, 673 P.2d 1301 (1983).
187. 101 N.M. 88, 678 P.2d 1163 (1984).
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vember 15, 1982, the plaintiff requested on September 23, 1982 that the
trial court reconsider its findings of fact and conclusions of law as specified
in the decision, and specifically challenged the trial court's award of
attorney's fees. The supreme court found that the plaintiff had properly
called the trial court's attention to the question of attorney's fees and,
therefore, had properly preserved the issue on appeal.' 88
During the survey year, the New Mexico appellate courts also addressed
the issue of reopening judgments. In Koppenhaver v. Koppenhaver,189 the
court of appeals held that a direct reversal in case law is an exceptional
circumstance to be considered in reopening a final decree. In Koppenhaver, the court found that there were unique circumstances justifying its
holding that the trial court must consider the wife's motion to set aside
a final decree of legal separation."9 The court held that the trial court
must consider modifying the decree under N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).' 9'
The exceptional and compelling circumstances necessary for a court to
consider reopening a decree were present in this case, because the trial
court had followed New Mexico law in refusing to consider the wife's
motion. 92 The supreme court then decided Walentowski v. Walentowski,193
which overruled the cases upon which the trial court had relied.
The supreme court's reversal of established precedent was an exceptional circumstance.' 94 The court of appeals held that the trial court must
use its discretion to determine whether the decree should be modified.' 95
The court stressed that the decision to modify the decree, and the extent
to which the decree might be modified, were strictly within the trial
court's discretion. The trial court's decision of what was fair and equitable
in a given case would only be overturned for an abuse of discretion. 196
188. Id. at 93, 678 P.2d at 1168.
189. Koppenhaver v. Koppenhaver, 101 N.M. 105, 678 P.2d 1180 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101
N.M. 11,677 P.2d 624 (1984).
190. Id. at 109, 678 P.2d at 1184. The separation decree was filed at a time when military benefits
were considered separate property. When the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Walentowski v.
Walentowski, 100 N.M. 484, 672 P.2d 657 (1983), reversing earlier precedent, Mrs. Koppenhaver
filed a motion to reopen the property settlement under N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
191. The court said that a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) was the appropriate motion. Although
it was not clear to the court which subsection of Rule 60(b) was being used, the court stated that it
did not matter. 101 N.M. at 108, 678 P.2d at 1183.
192. In Psomas v. Psomas, 99 N.M. 606, 661 P.2d 884 (1982), the supreme court held that the
Former Spouses' Protection Act was not retroactive. The Former Spouses' Protection Act allows
courts to treat military retirement benefits in accordance with their states' property laws. Id. at 609,
661 P.2d at 887.
193. 100 N.M. 484, 672 P.2d 657 (1983). Walentowski held that the Former Spouses' Protection
Act is retroactive. Id. at 487, 672 P.2d at 660.
194. See Koppenhaver, 101 N.M. at 109, 678 P.2d at 1184.
195. Id.
196. Id. In Harkins v. Harkins, 101 N.M. 296, 681 P.2d 722 (1984), the trial court refused to
modify the judgment, saying that the stipulated final divorce decree was equitable at the time it was
made. The supreme court agreed that the trial court had to consider Mrs. Harkins' 60(b)(5) motion
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IX. FINAL JUDGMENTS
The New Mexico courts continue to accept only those appeals stemming
from final judgments, except in a few limited circumstances.' 97 In Bartow
v. Kernan, 98 the court dismissed an appeal from the denial of a motion
for a protective order. The appellants sought to stay a deposition set to
be taken to perpetuate the deponent's testimony until the trial court decided the issue of the deponent's competency. Because an order granting
or denying a motion for a protective order under N.M. R. Civ. P. 26(C)
is not a final order, as it usually does not finally dispose of the case, the
court dismissed the appeal.'99 The court found that the appeal was not an
authorized interlocutory appeal under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-3-4 (1978). 200
A grant of summary judgment may not be a final judgment for purposes
of appeal. In City of Albuquerque v. Jackson,20 ' the trial court granted
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The grant of summary
judgment effectively disposed of all the issues in the case, but the defendant was permitted to amend his counterclaim to assert another claim.
Because the defendant could amend his counterclaim, the summary judgment was not a final judgment for purposes of appeal.22 Since the trial
2 3
court did not include the "magic" words "no just reason for delay" 1
in its grant of summary judgment, the defendant properly waited until
the conclusion of the case to file his appeal.2 °4
Whether a judgment is final can be important aside from the need to
determine the timing of an appeal. If a judgment is not final, a court in
another state will not give that judgment the full faith and credit required
under article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution. In Reeve v.
Jones,2 5 the court held that once a judgment in another state is considered
to reopen the decree, but said that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that an award
of alimony was equitable in lieu of dividing what at the time was thought to be the husband's
separate property. Id.at 297, 681 P.2d at 723. The court emphasized that the change in the law
making military retirement pay community property did not mean that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying a motion to reopen, but rather that the trial court must consider the motion.
Id.If the movant failed to show that it would be inequitable for the decree to have prospective
application, the fact that the decree to which the parties stipulated was entered at a time when the
law was different would not require the trial court to reopen. Id.
197. Appeals are also permitted from interlocutory orders which practically dispose of the merits
of an action, from final orders after a judgment which affects substantial rights, and from the grant
of partial summary judgment if the trial court states that "there is no just reason for delay." N.M.
R. Civ. P. 54 (b)(l).
198. 101 N.M. 532, 685 P.2d 387 (Ct. App. 1984).
199. Id. at 534, 685 P.2d at 389.
200. Id.
201. 101 N.M.457,684 P.2d 543 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M.419, 683 P.2d 1341 (1984).
202. Id.at 458-59, 684 P.2d at 544-45.
203. Id.at 459, 684 P.2d at 545; see N.M. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1).
204. 101 N.M. at 459, 684 P.2d at 545.
205. 101 N.M. 320, 681 P.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1984).
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to be final and can be enforced in that state, it can be enforced in New
Mexico. 2The pendancy of an appeal in another state will have no effect
on the execution of the judgment in New Mexico if there would be no
bar to the execution of that judgment in the state rendering the original
judgment. Goals of finality and national unification underlie the full faith
and credit clause; these goals can be upheld by allowing execution on an
original judgment once it is final for purposes of the original judgment
state's law.20 7
X. RES JUDICATA
The supreme court decided two res judicata cases in the last year. In
Xorbox v. Naturita Supply Co., Inc.,2 8 the court reminded practitioners
that res judicata is an affirmative defense under N.M. R. Civ. P. 8(c)
and, therefore, must be raised before entry of the judgment or it will be
waived.'20
Xorbox filed in New Mexico district court to recover on a default
judgment granted in New York against the defendants. The New York
court had granted relief for the principal and interest due on a promissory
note. In New Mexico, the defendants again suffered a default judgment,
and the district court granted recovery on the New York judgment and
awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs, as provided for in the note.
The defendants appealed, arguing that the res judicata effect of the New
York judgment barred the New Mexico court from granting attorney's
fees in the subsequent New Mexico action.2" °
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that, because res judicata is an
affirmative defense, the defendants had waived the defense when they
failed to raise it prior to entry of the default judgment.2 1' The defendants,
relying on N.M. Civ. App. R. 11, argued that they had no opportunity
to raise the defense of res judicata, and thus should be allowed to raise
the defense on appeal."' The court held that Rule 11 was inapplicable
because both of defendants' attorneys were present at the hearing on the
motion to set aside the New Mexico default judgment. Furthermore, the
defendants were given time to object to the New Mexico court proceeding
after they had received notice of that proceeding.2t3
206. Id. at 321-22, 681 P.2d at 747-48.
207. Id. at 322, 681 P.2d at 748.
208. 101 N.M. 337, 681 P.2d 1114 (1984).
209. Id. at 339, 681 P.2d at 1116.
210. Id. at 338-39, 681 P.2d at 1115-16. The defendants argued that the full faith and credit
clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, prevented the New Mexico court from adding attorney's fees and
costs to the New York judgment when the New York court had not awarded attorney's fees. 101
N.M. at 338-39, 681 P.2d at 1115-16.
211. 101 N.M. at 339, 681 P.2d at 1116.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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The court did not reach the question of whether the defense of res
judicata would have been available had the defendants raised it before
the entry of the New Mexico default judgment. The defense of res judicata
was permanently waived, however, when the defendants failed to raise
it after entry of the default judgment.
In Myers v. Olson,21 a the court held that a prior stipulated final decree
which determined the property rights of the parties was res judicata as
to the plaintiff's subsequent claim of an interest in the property.21 In
Myers, residential property was awarded to the plaintiff's former wife
according to a stipulated final divorce decree. The former wife then deeded
the property to her daughters. After the death of the former wife, the
plaintiff brought an equitable lien action, alleging that his former wife
had promised him that he could live in the house during his lifetime and
that the daughters (the defendants) would be unjustly enriched if the court
did not impose an equitable lien. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the property rights had been determined in
the earlier dissolution proceeding. The trial court granted the motion, and
the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed.216
The final decree clearly and unambiguously stated that the property in
question was the former wife's separate property.2" 7 The court noted that
res judicata is used to protect parties from relitigating lawsuits, "to promote judicial economy," and to encourage reliance upon final judgments.2" ' The court then looked at the four elements necessary for the
application of res judicata and determined that those elements were present.21 9 The court stated that both suits must be identical, in that: "1) the
parties must be the same or in privity; 2) the subject matter must be
identical; 3) the capacity or character of persons for or against whom the
claim is made must be the 22same;
and 4) the same cause of action must
0
be involved in both suits.
The first element was met because the defendants were in privity with
the plaintiff's former wife by virtue of the deed giving them the property.
The existence of an equitable lien on the property would clearly have
been an issue in the dissolution proceeding because the decree expressly
divided the property of the plaintiff and his former wife in an equitable
manner. 22' Thus, the second element of res judicata was met. The third
214. 100 N.M. 745, 676 P.2d 822 (1984).
215. Id. at 749, 676 P.2d at 826.
216. Id. at 745, 676 P.2d at 822.
217. Id. at 746, 676 P.2d at 823. The final decree did not refer to any agreement between the
plaintiff and his former wife concerning his right to live in her house after the divorce. Id.
218. Id. at 747, 676 P.2d at 824.
219. Id. at 747-48, 676 P.2d at 824-25.
220. Id. at 747, 676 P.2d at 824 (citations omitted).
221. Id.
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element necessary for application of res judicata also was met because
the capacity or character of the persons involved was the same in both
actions insofar as the property interest was concerned.222
The court discussed the fourth element in detail. Referring to Three
Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux,223 the court determined that the same cause
of action was involved in both suits.224 In deciding that both suits involved
the same cause of action, the legal theories available to the parties were
not determinative. Rather, "the cause of action is to be viewed in the
context of the transaction from which it arose." 2 5 The earlier form of
judgment, a stipulated decree, had no effect on the applicability of res
judicata to bar a second action arising from the same transaction as the
earlier suit.

222. Id.
223. 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982).
224. 100 N.M. at 747, 676 P.2d at 824.
225. Id. The court referred to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, §§ 24, 25 (1980), and
applied the transactional test found in those sections. Because the second suit would involve the
same proof presented in the first suit and the same facts decided in the first suit, the court found
that the issue of whether the plaintiff had an equitable lien on the residential property would have
formed a convenient trial unit with the earlier dissolution proceeding. 100 N.M. at 748, 676 P.2d
at 825.

